Why do some economies adjust more successfully than others? lessons from seven African countries by Husain, Ishrat
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1364
Why  Do  Some  Economies  AUn.:m~e.n
Adjust  More  Successfully  Pylaeship tha
contex6tofi  the  cunt.s  long-~ Than Others.? term de.eiopment  can bond
andcerrenit.divire  and
d.
Lessons from Seven African Countries  iegnvwortan
:~,nurture  a shared  vision ro?the'~
Ishrat Husain  ure  -
TIhe  World  Bank
Africa  RF4ona1  Office
Office  of  the Chief  Economist
















































































































dI  POLICY  RESEARCH WORKING  PAPER 1364
Summary  findings
The sustained  application  of adjustment policies  is  measures  to develop rhis  capacity  within the long-term
explicable  in terms of two variables  - domestic  framework.  This framework  can then be translated into
ownership  and capacity.  These findings  carry important  rime-bound,  specific  action programs  on various agreed-
implications  for the future policies  of African  on changes  between the donors and the African
governments  and their external partners.  govemrnments.
There is an urgent need for the African  governments  to  Both the African  governments  and their external
go beyond their limited and small  groups of technocratic  partners have to rethink the measures  that will build,
advisers  and civil  servants  to consult, educate, and  save, use, and enhance the capacity  of African
inform the representatives  of the civil  society and  governments,  private sectors, nongovernmental
opinion-makers  in the design  and implementation  of  organizations,  professional  groups, universities,  and
adjustment policies  and institutional  restructuring.  A  research institutes.  The adversarial  relationship between
strong, committed,  and visionary  leadership  that places  the government  and the private  sector will have to be
these policy  reforms in the contexr of the country's long-  transformed into a symbiotic  and constructive
term development  can bond and cement  diverse and  partnership aimed at achieving  the long-term
divergent  viewpoints  and nurture a shared vision  for the  developmental  goals. The effeciveness of the present
future.  practices  of delivering  the technical  assistance  by external
For the international  financial  institutions  and external  donors has been sufficiently  questioned, and a new way
donors who are supporting African  governments,  the  of delivering  this assistance  employing  capacity  building
narrow, short-term, and conditionality-driven  and utilization  as the overreaching  oblective  needs to be
enforcement and compliance  of agreements  needs to be  developed.  The transferability  of institutions  or policies
replaced  by a medium-  to lbng-term framework  of  from one setting to another has always  proved difficult,
macro, sectoral policy, and investrnent  and institutional  but adapting successful  practices  that have  worked
changes developed  and owned by govemment  - keeping  elsewhere  should be encouraged.
short-term capacity  as given constraints, but taking
This  paper  - a product  of the Office  of the Chief Economisr,  Africa  Regional  Office  - is  based  on a recent  study  on adjustment
in  Africa.  Copies  of this  paper  are available  free fromthe  World  Bank,  1818  H StreetNW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  contact
Joy Schwartz,  room  J5-255,  extension  32250  (44 pages)-  October  1994.
- The  Policy Resarch Worbkg  Paper  Series  dissinates the findgs  of woruk  n progss  to encour  the Exchange  of ideas  about
development  issucs An obicjaih of th  secries  istoget  the findings  out quickly,  cven if thepresetations are  less  than fully polishedL  The
papers  cary the names  of th  atbhwrs  and should  be usdand citedacrdingly.  Thefinings.  intrpretatons, andcondlsions arc thc
aJuaors'  own and should  nor be attributed to the World  Bank its  Excutiv  Board of  Directorsm  or any of its member  countries.
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The broad literature on structural adjustment often falls into the habit of making
wholesale  judgments of the sort:  "adjustment  does or does not work because..."  And,
not surprisingly, the vast majority of this writing tends to view adjustment negatively.
Not only are we thus subjected  to wholistic assessments  of structural adjustment, we are
also subjected to universaistic explanations. George Ayittey.1/  for example, in a recent
essay denounces the World Bank for its support of adjustment  prognams  which he claims
do not take account of political and social realities in Africa, and embody a host of other
evils.
These wholesale views both of  the relative success or  failure of  adjustment
policies and  of  its  causes  are  definitively challenged by  the  Bank's  recent  study
1/ A paper presented at the second biennial International Conference on African Economic Issues at Arusha,
October 11-14, 1994.
The author is grateful to Prof.  0.  Aboyade, Ladipo Adamolekun, Mark Baird, Robert Calderisi, Kevin
Cleaver, Luis de Azcarate, Steve Denning, Paul lsemnan,  Ravi  Kanbur, Bob Piciotto, Mike Stevens, Gene
Tidrick for useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.  Geoffrey Bergen was particularly helpful in
restructuring and reorganizing the analysis and findings contained in this paper.
Zt The author is Chief Economist, Africa Region.  The views expressed in this paper are personal and
should not be attributed to the World Bank, its Management or the Board of Directors.
3/  Ayittey. G.,  "Aid for Black Elephants: How Foreign Assistance Has Failed Africa,  D. Bandow and L
Vasquez (eds), in Peipetarang  Poverty: 7he World Batk,  the  MFF,  and  the Developing World, CATO
Institute, Books in Brief.-2-
Adjustment in Africa,1 which demonstrates, (1) that there is considerable variation in
the economic results of adjustment programs among African countries, and (2) that this
variation is explicable in terms of the quality and sustained application of adjustment
policies.
This paper moves a step beyond the Bank's adjustment study by undertaking to
identify the causal linkages underlying whether or not adjustment policies are sustained.
It develops hypotheses which account for why some countries sustain their policies while
others do not. In doing so it profits from the extensive literature in politics and political
economy. It tests these liypotheses with evidence from seven case studies developed in
relation to the Adjustment in Africe'  project.
The Seven Cases
The recent World Bank study Adjustment in Africa assessed at some length the
extent to  which economic policy reforms were implemented in  29 countries that had
ntroduced structural adjustment programs in the 1980s.  The study found that the record
of implementation  was mixed: only six countries had brought about large improvements
in macroeconomic  policies, nine expenenced minor improvement  and eleven deteriorated.
Among  the last  group  were several CFA  countries which have  since undertken  a
significant devaluation (January 1994). Countries that improved their policies, however,
had a pay-off in terms of higher per capita GDP growth, large exports, faster agriculture
and  industrial sector  growth.  However,  even in  the  relatively successfil  countries
progress  in  public  enterprise  reform,  financial  sector  reform  and  public  sector
management has been less satisfactory.  The case studies of adjustment experiences in
seven African countries-Burundi,  Cote d'Ivoire,  Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and Tanzania-
4/ Adjuwe  in Afnica. Rejfonns, Resuks  and dc  Road Ahead,  World Bank, Oxford University Press,
1994.
51 Husain, L and  E'arnqee,  R., Ajmsemnt  in  fica  Lecssons  from  Country Case Studies,  World Bank
Sector and Regional Studies,  1994.-3  -
corroborate  these  findings  but also  point to the intermittent,  patchy  or uneven  course  of
implementation.  Only in two countries,  Ghana  and Tanzania,  has there been  a steady
implementation  of reforms. Nigeria  had five years of fairly good economic  outcomes
as a result of adjustment  programs, but eroding political support finally led to the
abandonment  of  reforms.  C6te d'Ivoire and Senegal were constained in fuller
application  of all the policy levers by adverse shocks.  Burundi suffered  a  setback
because  of unforeseen  adverse  political  circumstances,  while  Kenya  has gotten  back on
track only after a two-year  hiatus. In none of the seven  countries  is the reform agenda
complete  or the policy stance adequate; nor are prospects  for rapid, sustainable  and
equitable  growth  bright.
Three Hypotheses
The key questions which arise therefore are:  If  these policy reforms are
associated  with such  high  pay-offs  then  why are these  reform  programs  not sustained  and
implemented  consistently?  Why are thley  derailed?  Why is the record  so different  from
other low income  countries  such  as in South  Asia?
The determinants  of sustainability  of economic  reforms  cover a wide range of
variables-initial  conditions  specific  to each  country;  design, content  and sequencing  of
reforms; ownership  and political  commitment,  particularly  from a strong, visionary
leadership; administrative and  implementation  capacity; the  conditionalities of
international  financial  institutions  and external  donors;  and unanticipated  external  shocks.
In Africa, there are added  complications-on  the economic  side  at the time  reforms  were
initiated, output was declining,  unemployment  was rising, and sociai services were
strained, while on the political side the reforming  countries were facing increased
pressures  for transition  to more  pluralistic  fonns of government.
Under these circumstances,  it becomes  extremely  difficult to disentangle  the
strength  and magnitude  of each of these  factors  at work  A more  tractable  approach  is- 4 -
to group these variables together and analyze the contribution of each group separately
assuming that  the appropriate functional fonn  of  relationships is  additive and  the
interactive terms are at best weak or insignificant. The question of design, content and
sequencing of reforms, and the specific initial conditions have been analyzed in  the
volume on case studies itself and is, therefore, left out of the present paperY
This paper therefore focusses on the political economy aspects of sustainability
of economic  reforns,  introduces three basic hypotheses,  and presents the evidence of the
seven case studies at hand.
The po'd.ucal  economy of adjustment has become a burgeoning area of interest in
the  literature  drawing on  the  inter-disciplinary tools of  analysis and  cross-cuntry
comparative perspectives?'. Several useful insights have been gained through this body
Of  research.  The literature on the political  economy of economic  refonns can be roughly
classified witiin three broad categories or approaches to the sort of questions we have
psd.
The first of these focusses on extemal causes of economic stgnation.  Although
not inherently a topic of singular interest to the political left, the analysis of external
causes sometimes appears to have become the monopoly industry of radical thinkers,
many of them drawing heavily on Leninist doctines.  Despite variation in emphasis and
approach, writers such as Andre Gunder Frank, Paul Baran, Walter Rodney, and Samir
6/ The impact  of She  conditionalities  of interational fiacial  institutions  and donors, in respect to
adjusment programs, have  also fbrmed  the subject  of research  by an independent  group  of scholars  headed
by P. Mosley,  1. Harrigan  and J. Toye, Aid and Power,  2 Vols., London:  Routiedge,  1991.
7/  For the more nteworthy pieces  of research  in this area see: J. Nelson  (ed.) Econonmc  Crisis and Policy
Choice:  The  Polt  of Adjusmen  in she Third  World, Princeton:  Pnnceton  Umversity  Press, 1990;  S.
Haggard  and R. R. Kaufma (eds.), 7he  Policr  of Econnmic  Adjustment,  Princeton:  Princeton  University
Press, 1992; Thomas,  J. and Grindle, MV.,  Publc C2zice and Polcy  C7age: The  Poltcal  Econom7y  of
Refim  in Devdoping Counies,  Baltimore:  John Hopkins  University  Press, 1991;  T. CaUaghy  and J.
Ravenhill,  -Reponses to Africa's Decline in Hmrned In, New Yorkb  Columbia  University  Press, 1993;
R. Bates and A. Krueger (eds.), Politcal and Eonomc  Intmeraons in Economic  Poliy  Abrn  Evidence
from  Eighth Countries, Oxford  Basil Blackwell, 1993;  Webb, S. and Haggrd,  S-, Voting  for  Rejorm,
OxFord: Oxford University Prems, 1994.Amin all began from the unquestioned assumption that third world underdevelopment
stemmed from the prolongation of imperialist domination, via metropolitary power to
manipulate markets and capital flows, into the post-colonial era.3/  While the end of
the  Cold  War,  coupled with  the  highly visible  success of  the  East  Asian market
economies, has cooled the ardor  of  dependency theorists, a  variant of  this  line of
reasoning lives on in a "third worldistf critique of the Intenational Financial  Institutions.
As a large number of critics have pointed out, the trouble with theories that place
entire causal weight on extemal factors is that they neglect dynamics wiln  developing
countries that might account in a very large  measure for their growth or stagnation.
Thus, a number of analysts have focussed attention on the state and its political motives
in guiding national economies  toward growth or decline. 2 9
Yet another major approach in politcal economy that relates to domestic caluses
of policy change stems from the piorneering  work of Marcus Olson 19. This vein of
thought focusses attention on the power and motives of social collectivities, or interest
groups in influencing the state in ways that may impede economic growth.  Writing in
this tradition, Haggard and Kaufman posit that economic policy change is plagued by
numerous collective action problems.  Stable prices can be viewed as a public good, but
individuals and firms can gain from policies that undenmine stability and  might be
reluctant to bear the costs of stabilization  if others do not do so as well.  Similarly, trade
liberaization  or  state enterprise reforms can  generate overall efficiency gains,  but
individual  firms or sectors will lobby to retain particularistic benefits. This literature is
less clear on  the hows and the pc  of  managing the transition from a  state of
81 There has been a number of able analyses of this school of thought.  See, for example D1F. Ruccio and
LH.  Simon, 'Perspective  on Underdevelopment Frank,  the Modes of Production School, and Amin,'  in
C.K  'Wiber and K.P.  Sameson (eds), The Paoical  Econony  of Deveopment  and Underdeveopment,  Fifth
Edition, New York: McGraw-Bill,  1992.
21 Skopul, T. et al, eds.,  Binging  the State Rack  n,  Princeton: Princeton University Press,  1986, and
Calaghy,  T,  The Stae  Society Sruggle  in Zaire.
101  Olson, M.,  The  Logic of Colecdve  Acion,  Cambridge: Harvard University Press,  1962.-6  -
undesirable  and distorted  economy  to a desirable  and sustainable  path. The uncertainties
about the lilcey impact of various policy actions, and the gaps in information  and
knowledge  about the responses  of the diverse  groups  of economic  actors  under  varying
political  regimes,  mak: this an extremely  difficult  task.
We draw on all these schools  of thought  in formulating  the following  three
hypotheses  about the sustainability  or otherwise  of economic  reforms  and present the
evidence  from seven  African  countries  to test them:
Hypothesis 1:  Variation  depends  on a set of initial  conditions  which precipitate
the decision to undertake adjustment  programs.  These conditions  can be
systematically  identified  across countries in the realms of  economics,  local
politics,  and the approach  of international  donors.
(i)  Whether economic conditions are desperate or  not.  When economic
conditions  have  reached  a complete  collapse,  then  countries  consider  that
the benefits from adjustment  policies are likely to exceed the costs
compared  to the existing  or other alternative  strategies.  The genuine
commitment  to initiate reforms in such conditions  is  expected to be
stronger  than countries  where  the economic  decline  is not perceptible.
(ii)  Whether  economic interests  are strongly  or weakly organized, and whether
they have  preWously established a degree of leverage  over the state in its
power to distribute appropriable  rents.  Where economic  interst  groups
of  a  rent-seekdng  character have such power over the  state, then
adjustment programs may be  implemented superficially, based on
negotiations  of the sort that Callaghy  has referred  to as the "ritual  dance'
of African  finance  ministers  before  the International  Financial  Institutions
(IFI's)--but  which  is not  coupled  with  real commitment  to overiding local
interests.- 7 -
(iii)  Whether  leadership  is committed  to reform. The quality  and devotion  of
leadership  to reform  is an overlooked  variable,  and cannot  be reduced  to
the nostrum  "political  will."  It may  prove to be critical  whether  leaders
fully understand the  need for  adjustment, and  whether they  feel
ownership.
(iv)  Whether  donors  are willing  to invest  their  political  capital  in supporting
reforn.  The case in point is France's prolonged  subvention  of the CFA
franc, with all its implications  for the francophone  African countries;
however,  there are many  other examples,  such  as the continued  practice
of  many donors to provide free technical  assistance in  spite of  its
weakening  effects  on capacity.
hiypoihesis  2:  Variation  depends  on the country's sense  of uownershipu of the
reform process, which may be defined to include two basic elements:  (1)
Consensus  among the social and political  organizations  that constitute  national
civil societies;  and (2) the presence  of a technocratic  core group  in government
that is truly devoted  to the reform  process.
"Ownership"  is presented  as a hypothesis  separate  from that of initial
conditions,  because  it may be possible  to develop  after the initiation  of
reforms.  Oftentimes,  this takes place at the initiative  of govemments,
who hold  public  discussions  and debates  involving  trade  unions,  opposition
political  forces, community  organizations,  businesses,  and so on.
Hypothesis 3:  Variation  depends on the presence of 'capacity" in a given
country. Capacity  is defined  as human  capital  and the resiliency  of institutions.
The East Asian economic  miracle, as another study by the Bank has recently
made  clear, shows  the utter necessity  of having  in place  the individuals  capable
of identifying,  planning  and implementing  policy. This implies  also strong  civil-8  -
service  institutions,  and  norms  and regulations  which  prevent  political  interference
in the work  of policy  units.
The limitations  of this  paper should  be addressed  upfront. It does  not analyze  the
nature of governments,  regime types, or the nature of  political institutions,  i.e. a
benevolent  social  guardian  or predatory  state  or the hard and soft character  of the state,
or the protypes  of autonomous  and factional  states  of the Lal-MyintILl  typology. In that
typology,  autonomous  states  are  all characterized  by the  relative  freedom  from  overniding
influences  of particular  economic  groups,  while the factional  state  is characterized  by a
coalition  of different  interest  groups.  The governing  coalition  seeks  to maximize  the
well-being  of the members  of the coalition,  subject  to attempting  to stay in power  and
retain  their governmental  budget  constraint. We concede  that these  influences  affect  the
behavior  of governments  in maldng  economic  decisions  and these  decisions  may,  in turn,
hamper  or facilitate  the politcal process  itself. However,  this kind of analysis,  though
useful and interesting,  falls beyond  the scope  of the case studies  upon which this paper
is based.
As outlined  above,  we  also  do not examine  the question  of "conditionality"  of the
IFI's and the bilal  donors  or the enforcement  of conditionalities  and the bargaining
power of the IF's  vis-a-vis  the recipient countries-important  as they are.  Official
foreign  capital  plays a critical  role in the initiation  and sustainability  of reform efforts,
policy advice and dialogue with the IFI's and the extent of compliance  with loan
agreements  do make a difference. We do, therefore, investigate  whether the  FI's
financing  was a motivating  force behind the decisions  by various countries  to inifiate
reforms.  KahlerW  has made an interesting analysis  of  the external influence  and
conditionality  of  the IFI's wiffi respect to economic  policy reforns  in developing
111 Lal, D. and Myint, IH. Poveny, Equity  and Ecoxonoc Growth.  World Bank Comparative  Study,
Mimeo 1990.
12/ Kahler,  M., "External  Influence,  Conditionality  and the Politics  of Adjustment",  in S. Haggard  and R.
F. Kaufman  (eds),  The  Poliics QfJEconmic  Adjmaent,  Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press, 1992.-9-
countries.  He argues  that the IFI's face  a difficult  problem  of adverse  selection  in those
countries  that are candidates  for assistance,  since governments  rarely turn to finance
coupled  with  policy  conditionality  unless  their economic  plight  is critical. Mosley,  et
al.W have investigated  the phenomenon  of conditionality  by examining  a number  of
country  cases  and we draw upon  their  analysis  to shed  some  light  on the discussion  of
the possible  tension  between  conditionality  and ownership. But in our study, we
delibertely chose  to evaluate  the perfornance  and results  from the adjusting  country's
perspective  rather  than  that of the EFI's  or the donors. This does  not imply  that donors
had no responsibility  in the implementation  of these  programs. The  case studies  and the
main volume  show that there is a substantial  gap between  the actions  "agreed"  upon
between  the EFI's  and the recipient  countries  and the actual  policy  choices  made.
We  examine  below  the seven  country  case  studies  to test  each  of three  hypotheses:
(a) Why did the countries  decide  to undertake  adjustment  programs?  (b) How broad-
based  was the ownership  of these  programs?  and (c) How effective  was the capacity  to
implement?
Why did the Countries  Decide  to Undertake  Adjustment  Programs?
The decision to  undertake these programs is  reached-though  not always
consciously  or deliberately--when  the costs  of continuing  with existing  policies  exceed
the net benefits  that  can be realized  by pursuing  adjustment  programs.  One  of the main
elements  in this calculus  is the expectation  of external  resource  availability  from the
international  financial  institutions  and donors  and the prospects  of debt  rescheduling  in
future.  The net benefits  can be conceived  to consist of two components-first,  the
expected  external resource  availability  including  debt relief, and, second, the likely
improvement  in the domestic  economic  performance  such  as increased  domestic  savings,
rise in export eamings, substitution  of food imports by domestic  production,  etc.
Although  the separation  may  not always  be that  sharp,  this analytical  distinction  provides
L3/  Moslcy,  P. et al. op. cit.- 10-
a useful  way  to examine  the  questions  of ownership  and  commitment.  In countries  where
the decisioni  to embark  upon  the program  is driven  primarily  by the considerations  of the
first component of  the benefit stream, the implementation  remains highly fragile,
adversarial  and conditionality  ridden. There are two variants  of this trend. First, there
is a bargaining  game  in which  the  recipient  country  tries to extrac maximum  amount  of
resources  with as little changes  in policies  as it can  get way  with, and the International
Financial  Institutions  (WI's)  and the donors  placing  as many  conditionalities  as possible
and tranching  their releases  of fund on pre-specified  actions  in policy changes. The
second  variant is that the IFI's themselves  take the initiative,  on the basis of their own
analysis,  to persuade  and con; nce the countries  about the need to undertake  reforms.
On the other hand, wher_ the driving force is a genuine  desire to bring about some
improvement  in the domestic  economic  performance,  i.e., the second  component  of the
benefit  stream, the chances  for sustained  progress  are much  bright The ownership  and
commitment  in this case are high, while the main tactic under the former case is to
substitute  adjustment  by external  resource  inflows  and delay  taidng  tough  decisions  which
may have  negative  political  repercussions.
The willingness  to initiate  comprehensive  and radical  reforms  is more  likely to
surface  in countries  where  the economic  system  has  failed  or collapsed  and the  conditions
are desperate.  Pre-emptive  reforms designed  to ward off the disastrous  effects of
unsustainable  fiscal  deficits  or to raise mediocre  rates of growth  will encounter  greater
resistance. The semblance  of an orderly  and apparently  functioning  economic  system,
but ridden deep  down with serious  distortions,  may  lull the craving  for reforms.
Supply  response  is also linked to initial conditions. Economic  conditions  are
more likely to improve  perceptibly  when the economy  is already operating  well within
the production  frontier. Thus, countries  which  have  experienced  system  failures  are not
only more likely to undertake  reforms  for the right reasons  but also to sustain  reform
because  expectations  will be reinforced  by better  performance.- 11  -
Van de Walle'4 has advanced an interesting hypothesis about the failure  of
economic  reform programs in Africa.  According to him) "Government  economic policy
priorities and  implementation in  most African states have long been influenced and
subverted by the actions of groups and individuals-  who lack formal representation in the
political sys:-m but can cake  advantage  of the State's weak capabilities and the clientelist
networks that pervade it to pursue individual  and parochial interests. Indeed, the failure
of economic  reforms is sometimes attnbuted to this type of informal participation."
The reason for the domination of this infornal group of actors arises primarily
from the lack of commitment  to long-term develcpment and the absence of a clear vision
by the top political leadership on the direction in which the country should be moving.
If there was such a long-term framework and vision of the future, it would become clear
that economic reforms are only one of the several elements necessary to attain the long-
term development goals.  Leaders, who are too pre-occupied with fighting day-to-day
crisis  situations  and  have  limited  horizons,  consider  economic  reforns-quite
understandably-as irrtants and external impositions  without realizing  the links with long-
term development. For them, the political costs of these refonns are paid upfront when
they have the responsibility, while it is not obvious if they would be in power at the time
when benefits start accming.  The distribution of the pains of adjustment is always
highly skewed.  The rent  seeking and privileged classes had  alrady  accumulated
sufficient wealth, taking advantage  of policy distortions in the period before adjustment,
and, thus, cushioned themselves from the pains.  But the rest of the society suffers in the
immediate aftermath of adjustment  programs as food subsidies are eliminated, imported
goods become expensive, real wages decline, and public sector employment is either
frozen or cut.  Political leaders, whether elected or authoritarians, are hardly able to
fathom this situation.  This time inconsistency  issue has been analyzed in understanding
the behavior of economic agents and is equally applicable to political actors. Unless a
141 Van de Wale,  N.,  "Political Liberalization and Economic Policy Reform in Africa",  World
Development, Vol. 22, April 1994.- 12 -
new domestic constituency  in support  of the reforms emerges, the pressures from the rent
seeking and privileged elites, who are the losers, would remain intense.  But there is
insufficient understanding  as to how new coalitions of the potential beneficiaries of the
reforms-small traders and entrepreneurs, informal sector and rural population-can be
built.
How did the above factors-economic conditions, strength or weaknesses  of the
interest groups, the quality of top leadership and the role of external donors-influence
the decisions of the countries in undertaking  adjustment in the seven African countries,
and which one of these  factors was relatively  more  dominant?  The case studies shed
some light on this question.
In Nigeria, a newly installed government  found itself in the midst of an economic
decline and a large debt burden that was exacerbated by a precipitous decline in oil
prices-the  main source of the country's foreign exchange earnings.  This reduced the
opportunities  and the amount available  to rent seekers to collect rents through  the existing
foreign exchange and import allocation system, thus softening their resistance to the
reforms.  These interest groups witnessed the immediate  drying up of the sources of their
benefits and privileges when the import licenses issued to them could not be covered by
adequate foreign exchange allocations by the Central Bank. Had the export revenues not
fallen so drasfically, it is not clear if the government would have agreed to such radical
refonns, although  there was a growing domestic constituency  advocating  policy reforms.
The benefits perceived in this case were primarily debt relief that will relieve pressure
on the balance of payments, extermal  reserves and the budget.  It  would be fair  to
surmise that the motivation of the rulers for reforms in Nigeria stemmed  primarily from
finding a  solution to  extemal debt problems faced by  the country,  and the implicit
expectation that the increased cash flow obtained through debt relief will free foreign
exchange for domestic users.  This should not underestimate the role of those Nigerians,
who did believe  in broader econonic reforms to remove the urban bias and various other
policy distortions facing the economy and were influential in bringing about a massive- 13 -
realignment of  exchange rate  and liberalizaon  of  domestic agriculture pricing and
marketing.  President Babangida  not only went along by supporting this domestic refonn
constituency, but also defused the adverse fall out from the perceived involvement  of the
IFI's and extemal donors by organizing a debate and then rejecting the role of the IMF
in the Nlgerian economy.
In  Ghana, the  economic free fall was almost complete when  the Rawlings
Government assumed power in  1982.  The raison d'&re  of the  revolution was the
eradication of wide spread corruption in the economy, and it was soon discovered that
the major source of corruption and malpractice  were the exchange rate, import licensing
system, price controls and the monopolies enjoyed by the state enterprises.  It did not
take the new regime very long to realize that unless these distortions that were benefitting
a narrow class of urban elites and businesses were taken care of,  the crusade against
corruption would  remain ineffectual.  The PNDC,  after  fierce  inlternal debate  on
ideological  grounds, took the decision to embark on the adjustment  path and, after having
reached an internal consensus, formulated the program and approached the IFI's and the
donors for their support  In this case the divig  force was the conviction that policy
reforms would contribute to an improvement in the economy through eiminaton  of
corruption. As the new government was not beholden to the clientelism and, in fact, had
assumed power to eliminate their hegemony from the economy, it was able to take and
sustain decisive actions.
The interest groups in Ghana  had weakened  considerably  and lost their credibility.
They came to be identified with the economic malaise  the country had suffered for more
than a decade, and therefore were more of a political liability.  A popular and untainted
leader seized the occasion to discredit these interest groups further, gave free reign to a
smaUl  group of trusted technocrats to design alternate strategies, eliminated dissident
ideological viewpoint within the  ruling junta  that threatened his advisers'  preferred
options, and used the IFI's and external donors remarkably well to derive broad-based
benefits for the economy.-14-
Like Ghana, the economic conditions in Tanzania had also reached an abysmally
low level.  The  fundamental policy changes which were instituted may have been
precipitated by  the upsurge in popular resentment which arose in the country.  The
resentment was occasioned  by high rates of inflation, by shortages of many commodities,
and by low productivity within the agriculture sector.  Attempts to attract financial  flows
or to increase exports had not been successful  and the efforts made to solve the shortage
problem by cracking down on traders and other suspected hoarders had been too little or
of no avail1'. The change in the top leadership was publicly heralded by an admission
that the previous economic policies had not worked and alternative solutions were to be
found for arresting the economic  collapse.  The seeds of the policy change were sown
in  1984 when the govemment allowed the 'Own-Funded Import Scheme" under which
any one having foreign exchange abroad could bring in  certain category of  imports
without any restrictions.  Although  Tanzania has received exceptional amounts of gross
aid flows during its adjustment period, the volume of these flows in real and net terms
adjusted for  terms  of  trade  is  not  significantly different from what Tanzania  had
traditionally received in the pre-adjustment  period.  The evidence leads one to infer that
the foreign aid flows were not the motivating factor behind Tanzania's decision to pursue
this path of adjustment. The virtual collapse of the economy and the apparent failure of
the administered system of controls and allocations were the main factors behind the
decision.  But it does not belie the truth that without an increase in aid flows, Tanzania
would have been worse off and the adjustment policy measures would have faltered.
Although there was deep economic despondency in the country and the initial
liberalization efforts had demonstrated some "visible" results to a large segment of the
population, there was a great of ambiguity among the top leadership of the ruling party-
the CCM-about  wholesale abandonment of the 1967 Arusha Declaration that provided
the basis for the previous set of policies.  The fear of the domination of the economy by
the more enterprising Asian traders and entrepreneurs to the detriment of the indigenous
15)  Wangwe, S,  'A Review of StrcturAl Adjustment in Tanzania Since  1986',  in Sabiiaon  and
Adjismt,  UNDP,  1991.- 15 -
Africans loomed large in  their minds.  Unlike other countries where diverse vested
groups operated in the economy, the division in Tanzania ran along the indigenous vs
non-indigenous  lines.  The efforts by the IFI's and the donors to resolve this ambiguity
by insisting upon loan conditionalities  were not particularly successful, leading them to
acquiesce in a more protracted and cautious road of reforms.
Unlike  Nigeria,  Ghana  and  Tanzania,  the  economic decline  was  not  that
pronounced or perceptible in other countries.  In 1979, Kenya was hit by a sharp fall in
the price of coffee as well as by doubling in the price of imported oil.  Kenya was thus
forced to adopt a stabilization  program to reduce the ensuing macroeconomic  imbalances.
But Kenya never suffered from 'urban  bias" by which a part of the rurl  surplus was
siphoned off to subsidies on urban consumption and capital formation.  The leadership
in Kenya originated from the rural sector and remained committed to a remunerative
incentive structure for agriculture.  To that extent, the political economy of adjustment
in  Kenya was congruent with the interests of the rural majority and helpful toward
efficient food and export production.  Kenya decided to undertake structural adjustment
in search of finding a solution to ease the cash flow problem when it was faced with
serious foreign exchange shortages and payment pressures.
Senegal got into a financial crisis in the late 1970s, and a combination of poor
financial and investment  policies, worsened terms of trade and successive  droughts made
adjustment unavoidable.  But the need for structral  economic changes had become
apparent earlier on when Senegal lost its large French West African market and found
itself with oversized industries and an excess of highly paid civil servants. Being one of
the few democratic systems in Africa, Senegal was able to mobilize substantial extemal
resources over the years obviating the need  for fundamental  structural changes. To make
matters worst, the Government  responded to a short-lived  commodity boom in the early
years of the second half of the 1970s by borrowing heavily from foreign commercial
banks in the expectation of turning to more favorable terms of trade.  It was not until
December 1979 that it announced its medium-term  program for economic and financial- 16 -
adjustment  covering  the period 198084.  The decision  to initiate  structural  adjustment
was taken  by a group  of competent  technocrats  in the belief  that financial  and economic
imbalances  faced  by the  country  could  be resolved  with the aid of financial  support  from
the Fund and the Bank. Along with Kenya  and Turkey, Senegal  was the first country
to receive  an adjustnent loan from the World Bank  in 1980. Non-compliance  of the
agreed  measures,  however,  led to the cancellation  of support  by the Bank  and the  IF
in 1983.
In  Cbte d'Ivoire, the interplay between external and intemal factors led to
macroeconomic  destabilization,  but the Government's  own diagnosis  was that the crisis
was a result of temporary  terms  of trade deterioration  and external  financing  could tide
them over the crisis.  The past impressive  track record of rapid development  and
diversification  had endeared  the country to the donors and external  creditors, which
allowed  it to maintain  its previous consumption  and invesunent  levels by providing
exceptional  financing.  The initial attempts  to liberalize  the economy  were made in
response  to attactiveness  of the financial  packages  from  the donors  and IFI's to ease the
cash flow  problems  raller than any deep  conviction  about the efficacy  of liberalization
per se.  As subsequent  events  unfolded  and the competitiveness  issue became  the main
stumbling  block, the new  technocratic  leadership  took measures  to correct some  of the
distortions,  but the exchange  rate issue  had  by then  become  so overwhelmingly  important
that the other measures  produced  only a muted response. Foreign  borrowing  and aid
flows were the main motivating  factors, at the initial stage,  leading to the decision
opting  for stabilization  and adjustment  in COte  d'Ivoire.
Program design  and implementation  in Burundi  suffered  from a lack of initial
participation  and ownership  by the Government  and other economic  actors. As donors
were responsible for financing 80 percent of investment in  the country,  the general
approach taken by the Government was passive, and the influence and the role of the
IFI's  were highly visible in the design of the adjustment programs.  The Govemment's
commitment  further  cooled  when  the major  socio-political  groups  stiffened  the opposition- 17 -
to the program.  The restrictive policy of President Baganza  towards individual freedoms
clashed with the views of the Catholic church and other groups, turning the political
climate of Burundi less than propitious for successful  launch of economic reforms.  The
etinic violence that erupted in August 1988 had a further distabilizing effect, relegating
economic policy considerations to the back-burners of national concerns.
In brief, all the seven countries were hit hard by deep financial crisis when they
decided to  undertake structural adjustment programs, but in three  of these--Nigeria,
Ghana and Tanzania-the  economic decline was precipitous and the political regimes
decided to undertake reforms in order to arrest the decline and also correc. underlying
distortions. In Ghana, a combination of strong leadership, weakly organized interest
groups and careful use of donor assistance, helped initiate and sustained the reforms.
Although the Tanzanians also  had  weak interest groups and  enjoyed strong donor
support, the difference in the progress achieved by Tanzania is that the same political
party  that  was committed to  a  state-dominated economy has had  to  chamrpion  its
abandonment and lead the move to a market-friendly  economy.  This explains the slow
pace of reform in Tanzania.  The case of Nigeria falls somewhere in between Ghana and
Tanzania on the one hand, and Senegal and COte  d'Ivoire on the other.  The desire for
obtaining debt relief in the wake of failing oil revenues was accompanied, at least at the
earliest stage, by the attempts to realign the currency and liberalize agriculture pricing
and marketing.
The major impetus in the other four countries where the initial conditions were
not that desperate was the availability  of external financial  resources that would help ease
the payments pressures without any  genuine understanding or desire  to remove the
underlying distortions. The silent crisis that was going on in everyone  of these countries
did  not  evoke  the  kind  of  response from  the  leadership that  would address  the
fundamentals behind  the  imbalances.  The  status quo  of  interest groups  was not
threatened as was the case in Nigena, Ghana and Tanzania.- 18  -
How Broad-Based Was The Ownership  of These  Programs?
The earlier Bank studies of adjustment lending have concluded that the chances
of success are higher if there is ownership of the program by the country. These findings
also corroborate  Kahler'sLw  earlier work  whic.h showed that prior  commitment and
policy action (taken before external support is offered) are a good predictor of successful
implementation. Successful  influence is more likely if governments-  commit themselves
to an adjustment program and only then are supported financially  by the  IF's.
The meaning and definition  of ownership have, however, remained fuzzy, despite
the Bank's OED's attempt to elaborate on the definition of ownership and its application
to the Bank's  own lending experience for adjustment in Africaf'0  There are several
other practical problems.  First, what is the appropriate time path for strengthening  the
ownership?  If the reforms produce fairly early pay-offs, does this help strengthen the
ownership or  slow the pace?  Neither  theory nor evidence provide any guidance to
answer these questions- Second, the stability of the Government  itself is equally critical.
If the governments  keep changing  rapidly it is difficult  to establish ownership. In Africa,
the pattern has been frequent changes in the govemments  that has retarded the movement
towards ownership.  A third problem is that the economic  generosity of the donors, in
so far as it results in a soft budget constraint or allows the governments to postpone
taking tough decisions, may also slow down the progress towards ownership.  Finally,
at the intellectual level, there are  still remnants of ideological resistance to  "market-
friendly" paradigm of development  which underpins the adjustment policies.  The neo-
marxian, "dependency" school of thought, anti-colonialists  and others, who genuinely
believe that  the  "markets" are  anti-social, create inequities, hurt  the poor  and  are
repressive, still command  considerable  influence particularly among the non-economists.
There are well-meaning  African scholars  who fear that integration of Africa in the world
16/ Kahler, M. op.cit.
17/ World Banl, Adjusmewnt  in Sub-Saharan A!fica,  OED Report  No. 12155,  July 1993.-19-
economy  is beset with disastrous  consequences  as Africa  cannot  compete  with the rest
of the world. For them,  regional  inte:gration  and intra-African  economic  relations  appear
to be the only viable solution.
The  extraordinary  and  more visible influence, or  in  popular jargon,  the
'imposition"  of the World  Bank  and the IMF in the conceptualization  and design  of the
policy changes, has also affronted  a number of serious  Africans  and, in some cases,
strengthened  opposition  to otherwise  sensible  economic  policy  changes. Many  African
academics,  practitioners  and pnvate sector groups may broadly  concur with the basic
policy  tirust of these  programs,  but they find it annoying  that their advice  and analyses
on the same lines are ignored  by their own governments,  while the same govemments
follow the IFI's without  any questioning. This group of potenfally natural allies for
ownership  of economic  reforms  has either  distanced  itself  or joined the opposition.  This
nationalist  sentiment  can, in fact,  be harnessed  to enhance  the ownership  of the programs
rather than leading  to alienation.
"Ownership"  should not be construed  in a very narrow sense, i.e.,  of  the
government  in power, or, more specifically,  the economic  team of the government
consisting  usually  of the Finance  Minister,  Governor  of the Central  Bank,  Adviser  to the
President  and their staff.  Ownership  should  be much more  broad-based,  with a shared
vision and  a sense  of direction  in which  the economy  is to move. In the absence  of clear
.goals  and objectives,  the time  path required  for achieving  these goals  and the elements
of the consensus  forged, the mobilization  of support  from other socio-economic  forces
in the country  such  as private  businesses,  professionals,  political  parties,  NGOs, students
and labor unions, would prove difficult. The assumption  that external approval  from
donors  or MIF's  will persuade  or generate  a commitment  to economic  reform is unlikely
to prove valid.
Open discussions  and debates, communication  and interaction  among diverse
parties and groups are  the only feasible ways to enhance the acceptability  and- 20-
intlization  of the programs.  Trade Onion leaders in particular have often made the
point that,  if they were duly consulted, explained the rationale and justification for
various policy measures, and informed  about the likely consequences  and objectives, they
would be in a better position to make a healthy and constructive contribution  to both the
diagnosis and the required prescription.
It is also conceivable that ownership and commitment  could be associated with
some select elements of adjustment  programs, while other elements of the programs that
are not perceived to have popular support may lack ownership.  The implementation
capacity may therefore vary  under those circumstances, with the  non-controversial
elements of the package moving forward rapidly while others are being pulled back.
It is also not true ta  commitment  remains unchanged, even by the same regime,
hroughout  the process. The change in the commitment  can be sparked  by three different
factors.  First,  the losses to  rent seekers become much larger than what they had
expected and the pressure from this group becomes so intense that it  threatens the
survival of the regime.  Second, the domestic performance remains sluggish despite
adoption of  policy changes suggesting that  either the  design or  the content or  the
sequencing of reforms leave much to be desired.  Finally, either the level of external
resource flows remamns  below the target or other exogenous shocks  create adverse losses
that are not duly compensated.
Academic literature, on the issue of participation, seems to make a distinction
between the two different stages  of the design and implementation  of policy reforms.  At
the first stage, the executive authority must be firmly convinced of the necessity for
economic  stabiiization  and liberalization,  for without such a commitment, the leadership
will be unlikely to forge ahead with stringent recovery programs.  As the initial stage
usually involves changes in the incentive structure by altering key relative prices--the
exchange rate, producer prices, interest rates, price decontrols, removal of quantitative
restrictions-these can easily be carred out by a select  group of competent  and responsive- 21 -
civil servants. The reforms  need to be embedded  in solid technical  analysis  and can
therefore  be entrusted  to a small  group of technocrats.
The problem  usually  arises when the second stage of reforms is proposed  for
implementation-downsizing  the civil service, reducing consumer subsidies, closing
down, commercializing  or selling  public  enterprises,  restructuring  the financial  sector,
exposing industial  firms  to  competition, etc.  During this  phase, broad-based
consultation  and interaction  with those  likely  to be affected  by these  measures  can result
in finding  alternative  and mutually  acceptable  solutions,  and agreeing  on the timing  of
actions. Listening  to the genuine  concems  of those  who will be potentially  hit by the
reforms, and taking these into account at the time of designing  the program, will
faciitate implementation  later on.
But the limitations  of this participatory  and consultative  approach  should  also be
recognized. The technical  nature  of the issues  is bound  to keep  the discussion  to a much
smaller  audience  of educated  and well informed  groups  and individuals.  It is quite likely
that the debate  and  consultations  could  end up making  concessions  to this "participatory"
group at the expense  of a much  larger segment  of the population.  Public  policies  have
been  pro-urban  in Africa  historically,  with  only a few  exceptions; subsidies  intended  for
the poor have  been hijacked  by the well-to-do  and the political  influence  of the rentier
class has been disproportionately  strong.  The urban class, media, large private
businesses,  trade  unions  and academics  still  favor  rapid  urbanization  and indalaon
at all costs as the preferred model for solving  Africa's economic  ills, although  their
rhetoric  and justification  for this model are couched  in terms of helping the poor, the
unemployed  and the socially-disadvantaged  groups.
If this group-the highly dominant  participant  in the process of  debate and
consultation-is  successful  in influencing  and determining  the nature of the reforms  2nd
presents  this as a "consensus"  the interests  of the majority  of poor, who  live in the rural
areas and are not a participant  in this process, will certainly  suffer.  The examples  of-22  -
continuation  of petroleum  subsidies  in Nigeria--whose  beneficiaries  are mainly  the urban
middle  and higher income  groups--and  the high level of stipends  to university  students
in Francophone  countries,  illustrate  the inequality  of power  relations  which  will  manifest
themselves  in the 'consensus"  building  process.
Countries  in our sample  do not seem to have followed  the logical formula  of
consultation  and participation  in a systematic  manner. Two countries  had very broad-
based  open discussions  and debates  but only when  new  governments  came to power. In
Nigeria, the Babangida  Administration  threw open the debate on IMF loans and
conditionality  to the general  public  and the media.  It appointed  a presidential  advisory
committee,  headed  by an eminent  economist,  to help formulate  the adjustment  program
and consult  the opinion  makers. As  a result, the domestic  ownership  of the  program  was
strong  in the 1986-88  period  and policy  changes  proceeded  as envisaged.  But the failure
to subsequent  follow-through  with broad-based  consultations  with the business, labor
unions,  academia  and other influential  groups took a heavy  toll.  Communication  from
the authorities  to the general  public  became  scanty  and the 'visibility'  of the IFI's further
weakened  rather than strengthened  the process.  In a country with a free and vocal
media,  and with an articulate  intelligentsia,  it would  have  served  well if the Government
had carried  through  with  a more  intense  process  of consultation  and communication,  and
used the feedback  either  to modify  the elements  of the programs  that were resented  most
or explain  the rationale  and consequences  candidly. It is not always  easy to convince  the
public at large about the need  to reduce  domestic  oil subsidies,  but a candid  and frank
analysis  of the beneficiaries  and losers from abolition  of subsidy  would have certainly
helped.
At the initial stages, there was a  stiff opposition  to the introduction  of an
adjustment  program  in Burundi. However,  following  a change  in the Government  in
1987, the climate of uncertainty  and distrust was heightened  and it was considered
necessary  to generate  more  widespread  support  for the programs. Groups such as the
army, churches, private sector, academics,  and labor unions were involved in the- 23 -
monitoring  of the program after 1989 and the difficulties  encountered  earlier in the
implementation  were taclded to some extent. The internalization  of the program in
Burundi  was manifested  by the Govemment's  active  participation  in the design  of the
latest phase of the reforms.  This, in turn, made a difference  in much steady and
unfettered  implementation  of reforms  in the post 1989  period, until the change  of the
Government.  The example  of Burundi  illustrates  that ownership  is by no means  a static
concept  and can be transformed  over time and with effort from outright  rejection  and
opposition  to a fuller participation  and active  involvement  of domestic  constituencies.
Sandbrookl has offered  an interpretation  of the Ghanaian  case, which validates
the relevance  of broadening  the support  base for reforms.  He believes  that rigorous
programs  of economic  stabilizadon  and adjustment  in Ghana, that have been sustained
for a decade,  illustrate  the evidence  of "ownership". To own a recovery  program, a
government  must have a hand in shaping  the pace, sequence  and mix of policies. In
Ghana,  a smal group  of technocrats  had made  its voice  heard  by persuading  the IMF  and
the World Bank  to accommodate  the Ghanaian  Government's  views on the pace and
extent  of devaluation,  decontrol  of prices, trade liberalization  and privatization. While
it is conceded  that Ghana  had a team of competent  technocrats  who steered  the program
well and won concessions  from the IFI's and donors,  the more  demanding  reforms  such
as privatization  and public sector reforms have been stalled as other socio-econornic
groups  were not fully involved  either  in the design  or at the implementation  stage.
Senegal's example in the revision of the labor code provides an interesting
illustration  of the limitation  of the consultation  and participation  process. In 1990,  based
on an in-depth  study  of the labor market  in Senegal  by the ILO, the Government  decided
that the labor code should  be revised  completely. To maximize  support  for adopting  a
new  labor code, the Government  involved  the employers  and trade unions  in designing
the new code and infonned and educated  the public.  But the revised code was not
18/ Sandbrook,  R. "Political  Liberaiiaion  and the Politics  of Economic  Reform',  USAID  Conference
Paper, Washington,  D.C., 1993.-24  -
formally submitted  to the National Assembly  for ratification. Thus the broad-based
prcess  of consultation spread over a two-year period did not culminate in a type of
reform  that was socially  desirable  and acceptable  to aUl  three groups  directly  affected  by
the proposed  changes.
In Tanzania,  the replacement  of President  Nyrere, who remained  ideologically
opposed  to an adjustment  program by Mywini  in 1985, sparked  a wave of internal
debates  on the need  for structural  reforms  and on the issue  of seeldng  assistance  from  the
IMP.  A small  group of university-based  economists  took the lead  in organizing  public
debates involving  a wide spectrum  of society.  Such discussions  helped to build a
consensus  on devaluation,  on the introduction  of greater import liberalization  and
agrculture sector reforms. Since  the initial  phase  of the reform  program  succeeded  in
helping  to jump start  the stagnant  economy,  the role of more  reform-minded  technocrats
increased  significantly  by the  late 1980s. But the resistance  from the cadres  of the ruling
political  party, whose  background,  orientation,  hardened  attitudes  and ingrained  habits
were all opposed  to these reforns, diluted the efforts of the technocrats  and thus the
ownership  of the program  was  not that strong  as was  the case in Ghana  or even  Nigeria.
The case study  of Kenya  documents  that the first adjustment  attempt  (1980-84)
was spearheaded  by a small  coterie  of top  civil servants  and did not  enjoy support  beyond
this small  group. In the second  period, as some  of these  civil servants  left the scene,  the
commitment  of top officials  waxed  and waned. This happened  in a country  which  had
a fairly stable  political  climate  and a tradition  of strong  leadership. But the leadership
paid  insufficient  attention  to fostering  and maintaining  financial  discipline  which,  in turn,
undermined  the structural  reforms  needed  to lift the economy. The redeeming  feature
in Kenya, of  course, was strong support for the agriculture sector and the rural
population  that kept the overall  economic  distortions  at a lower tier than other African
countries. This rarely found convergence  of interests  among  the ruling political  party
and the majority of  small farmers resulted in much less damage to the economy
compared  to Tanzania,  Ghana  and Nigeria.- 25 -
The remaining country case--COte  d'lvoire-demonstrates a reverse sequence of
ownership.  At the initial stage, i.e.,  in the early  1980s, when the country decided to
undertake reforms,  there was very litfle support for carrying out the kind of policy
changes needed to set the economy back on trails.  But in the end, particularly since the
assumption of Prime Ministership by Outtara, there was a much greater realization and
commitment  to make the changes.  This commitment  was though limited to those in and
around the Prime Minister and very little efforts were made to bring in or convince or
debate other opinion makers and influential interest groups.  The opaque nature of the
discussions did not help sort out the legitimate concerns from those which originated
from "misperceptions' or  lack of proper information about the consequences of  the
reforms.
The evidence presented here shows  a mixed  pattern-strong ownership in the case
of Ghana and Nigeria (at the beginning) with the latter drifting away during the course
of implementation and finally abandoned with the change in  the political regime, a
moderate  ownership in the case of Tanzania, a renewed ownership in the case of Burundi
and  C6te d'Ivoire  and a  limited ownership in  the  case of  Kenya, which  has been
broadened and strengthened  more recently.  There is sufficient evidence that the degree
of success  in implementing  reforms is closely correlated with the broad-based ownership
of  the program.  Ghana, Tanzania, Burundi in the post-  1987 period,  and Nigeria
between the 1986-88 period, vividly proved this point.  Currently, C6te d'Ivoire is also
in the mist of implementing  a program that it fully owns.  The record of implementation
in Kenya has also improved since October 1993 when a new team of economic managers
took upon itself to persuade and broadened the support for the adjustment program.  But
the opposition by the old guard remains strong and therefore the ownership is far from
complete.
Another interesting question that needs to be explored in the context of ownership
is: Is there tension between conditionalities  of external donors and the country ownership
of the program?- 26 -
First of all, why should the donors use conditionalities  to enforce implementation
of reforms by the recipient countries? The debate on this issue is highly complex, but
we will provide one explanation that has been put forward by Collier-'L. He thinks that
one fundanental change in Africa's external economic relations since 1960 has been the
lack of "agencies  of restraint"--the  institutions  which  protect public assets from depletion,
prevent inflationary money printing, prevent corruption, protect socialy  productive
groups  from  exploitation and  enforce  contracts.  For  such  agencies  to  function
effectively, they must be protected from the pressures they are designed to uphold.  He
hypothesizes that because African presidents typically could not tolerate autonomous
centers of power, the donors have become  the new agencies of restraint.  These agencies
use "conditionalities"  as instruments of restraint.
A different perspective is provided by Herbst2', who argues that "There  is,  in
fact, every reason to believe that without dramatic extemal pressure, poor  economic
policies in African countries will continue". He worries that "should assorted proposals
alleviate the debt burden of even the poorest countries, there may be a strong temptation
on the part of African leaders to reduce the pace of economic reforms'.
Both these views underpin the donor conditionalities  that have been subject of
debate and controversy witiin and outside Africa.  The internal sources of demands for
policy changes from within the African civil society have begun to assert themselves  only
recently and that too sporadically. The resurgence of democracy, the increasing  demands
for transparency and accountability  and the emergence of a vocal press in Africa should
make the domestic pressures more important than the extemal agents of restraints and
in the ultimate analysis, it may be durable to strengthen the civil society and promote an
I9/  Collier, P., *Africa's  External  Economic  Relations  1960-90",  in D. Rimmer  (ed.), Africa 30 Years On,
London:  J. Currey  Press, 1991.
20/  Herbst J., "Structural  Reform  and Debt in Africa", in R. O'Brien and 1. Iverson  (eds.) Fruunwe  and  sla
Inrenarond  Economy,  Oxford  University  Press, Oxford, 1990.- 27 -
effective and knowledgeable  media and other countervailing  institutions  outside the
government  to provide  the restraining  influences.
The tension between "ownership"  and "conditionalities"  can arise when the
recipient  country  agrees to undertake  actions  as part of the conditionalities  under the
Bank  loan and/or the Fund  arrangements  or donor  programs,  and the loan conditions  are
either inappropriate  to the economic  context  of the country  or the country  has no real
intention  of complying  with those  conditions.
Mosley, et al.,W in their study of nine countries  receiving  adjustment  loans
from the World Bank, illustrate  this point by matching  the commitment  of reforms
favored  by the World  Bank  with the actual  implementation  of the loan conditions. The
zero or partial implementation  indicates  low commitment,  while full implementation
indicates  high commitment. But they argue  that there are two other cases. First, there
are cases  where full implementation  of a loan takes place  but the commitment  is low.
This is the case where  all formal  conditions  are scrupulously  performed,  but at the same
time, or shortly  afterwards,  other actions  are taken, the effect  of which  is to neutralize
the result of implementing  the original  condition. The other situation  arises when  loan
conditions  are not fulfilled  but commitment  to reform  is high. The authors  hypothesize
two causes  for this deviation. The first concerns  trivial  conditions-either  too broad in
scope or peripheral-a matter  of detail such  as the hiring  of consultants,  the design  of a
minor study, etc.  Second,  when  the required  conditions  are infeasible  or improbable.
In Ghana, the government  agreed to meet an ambitious  target of divesting  the state
enterprises  without  realizing  the depth  of the problem  of inter-enterprise  borrowing  and
the impediment  which  the inability  to value  each  enterprise  properly  would  place  in the
way  of divestiture.  The failure  to implement  loan conditions  in this case was compatible
with commitment  to reform.
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Does  the  evidence  from  these  seven  countries  in  -our  sample  shed  any light  on this
proposition?  Two  cases  can be cited in this regard  to show  that the components  of the
reform programs  which have strong ownership  can be implemented  without  explicit
conditionalities  of the EFI's,  but problems  can  arise if the conditionalities  are not well
rooted  and enjoy  domestic  consensus.
Nigeria's  program  of  devaluation,  abolition  of import  licensing  market-determined
exchange  rate, commodity  board  elimination  and liberalizing  agriculture  trade  was very
much designed by the  Government,  implemented  and  fully owned even before
approaching  the IFI's for assistance. On the other  hand, trade liberalizadon  was more
or less conditioned  by the IFI's and had little  internal  support. The Government  had to
reverse  some  of the actions  taken  under the Bank  Trade  Policy  Loan, under pressure
from  the manufacturing  lobby  and  resort  to reflationary  budgets  from  time to time  under
the influence  of some  non economic  advisers.
In the case  of Ghana,  most  reforms  were  put in place  after fierce  internal  debates
within the PNDC, once the antagonists  were removed  from the decision making
apparatus. The IFI's had conditionalities  focussed  mainly  on cocoa marketing  and
prstatal  reforms. The latter  have aen  much  longer  and have  not been  implemented
either  fully  or at the pace specified  in the loan  conditionalities.
How Effective  Was the Capacity  to Tnplement?
Aside from the interest  groups  and political  economic  considertions which  we
have  discussed  above,  the most  critical  missing  element  in most  African  counties is the
implementation  capacity  not only within  the government  but, more  broadly,  within  the
civil  society. The slow  accretion  of the right  skil mix, the dilution  and depletion  of the
stock  of already  trained  and experienced  professionals  through  migration,  and the non-
and low utilization  of existng capacity  for professional  work  differentiate  Africa  sharly
with South  Asia. The excessive  dependence  on foreign  technical  expertise,  the donors'- 29 -
own disposition to employ outside personnel to design and execute the projects and set
up new implementing agencies outside the normal governmental machinery and the
penchant of the political leaders to find 'loyalists'  rather than 'competent'  among the
civil servants, have contributed to the existing state of poor capacity.
Even countries which have political commitment  and willingness to reform, find
themselves seriously handicapped in  bringing about the desired changes due to  this
capacity  constraint.  The  combination  of  competent  technocracy and  reasonably
enlightened and popular leadership is rare to find in Africa as was the case in Asia.
As implementation capacity is,  by  and large,  weak in  most of  the countries
reviewed,  the  distinction between  "capacity saving" and  "capacity using'  reforms
becomes important.  As we have argued earlier, the first phase of reforms, which alter
the relative pnces,  liberate the capacity of key govemment officials and,  hence, are
implemented fairly rapidly once consensus is reached.  The other set of reforms that
entail more deep-seated change are  highly demanding on  the limited administrative
capacity of the govemment officials, and broad-based partcipation of other groups can
also help the process of implementation  also.
We believe that capacity is also endogenous to the ownership, commitment and
a sense of long-tern strategic vision and direction on the part of leaderships.  In Korea,
when President Park,  who had a clear vision of the direction in which Korea should
move and decided to promote exports, assembled a team of the most competent civil
servants and  entrusted the  task  to  them.  The President personally reviewed and
monitored the situation and allocated rewards and penalties on the basis of performance
in relation to the agreed targets.  This mode of intervention soon had a salutary and
positive impact on other civil servants, who wanted to demonstrate that they could also
do  the job  equally well.  Capacity bilding  in  this  case  was the  direct  result  of
commitment and ownership by the top political leadership in the country.- 30 -
In our view, implementation  depends not only on a set of technocratic measures
that can take place by  the acts--decrees and orders of civil servants--but also on the
capacity to manage the political support for these measures.  The upfront identification
of winners and losers from the various reforms has to be an integral part of the feasibility
of structural adjustment programs.  There is a diverse array of subgroups  and interests
within the government itself that will react differently to various reforms.  For example,
public  entexprise managers would  oppose reform  if  it  involves closing  down  or
retrenchment.  Ministries charged with revenue collection and fiscal balances would
respond favorably if a reform package added significantly  to available budget resources.
Civil servants might respond negatively to pay scale reform and cut back in employment
levels, but they might be deterred from opposition  if a reform lessened or removed legal
restrictions on  their private economic activities.  In  Nigeria, in  the early  years of
adjustment program, the military government imposed pay cuts on the military itself,
thereby establishing a  measure of fairness and credibility for the overall program  .'
But subsequently, the distribution of gains and losses from the adjustment programs as
among the military, the political class and the rest of the society had tumed out to be
unfair and perceived so widely.
Private sector constituencies  might  also behave differently. The more competitive
industrial concerns, crippled by shortages of foreign exchange and import restrictions,
might support trade reform as they did in many of the sample countries: export-oriented
farmers that are direct beneficiaries  of devaluation,  and producers of domestic food crops
respond favorably to pricing and marketing reforms.  The case studies report that in six
ont of seven countries, both export and food production rose in response to successful
devaluation and liberaization of prices and marketing.  Farmers in general benefitted
from shift of resources from urban consumers to rural producers.  Outher  poorer urban
groups, which had been hit hard by budget cut-backs, could have been supportive if
specially targeted programs had provided them assistance at the time such cut-backs  were
22  The discussion  is drawa  from  Gnllhali,  I,  "The  Political  Economy  of Reform  in Sub-Saharan  Africa,
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implemented.  The private sector operators, dependent on the government's discretion
to allocate foreign exchange, licenses, etc., do oppose the program.
Industrial enterprises in the modem sector which depend on subsidized imports
as raw matrials  and inputs and had protected domestic markets are certainly the losers
under the adjustment program.  On the other hand, small and micro enterprises in the
informal sector that had no access to foreign exchange allocations are the dynamic force
behind expansion.
In Africa there is a basic dilemma.  As Haggard and Kaufman2-3  point out "For
governments to reduce their role in the economy and expand the play of market forces,
the  state  itself must be  strengthened.'  On  the  one hand,  economic liberalization,
however,  entails  the  curtailment  of  powers  of  the  state  through  privatization,
deregulation, elimination of central planning and reduction in  the work force.  The
ensuing uncertainty, lower real wages and lack of job  security demotivate the  civil
servants and, in some cases, lead them to leave the public service.  On the other hand,
the tasks of the government to design, implement  and operate myriad components of the
structual  adjustment program, maintain and operate a framework of macroeconomic
policies that provide incentives  to the private sector, resolve the infrastructural  problems,
and  mediate conflicts within the  civil  society, would demand scarce technical and
administrative skills.  If  the civil  servants have lost their zeal and  motivation, the
required technical  and administrative  skill will not be available to lead the implementation
of reforms.
The  absence  of  a  strong  development-oriented visionary  leadership  fully
committed  to economic  reforms,  and  the dilemma  outlined  above  have  worsen.ed the
implementation capacity problem.  The process of reforms should be conceived and
presented in the context of long-term development vision.  But in absence of  such a
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vision, the process is  overtaken by considerations  of  political and administrative
expediency. 6rindle2' argues that because  of the absence  or weakness  of pluralist
institutions  that mediate  between  society  and the state, the implementation  process  may
be the major  arena  in which  individuals  and groups  are able  to pursue  conflicting  interest
and compete  for access  to scarce  resources. This conflict  finally  gets resolved  through
the mechanisms  of patronage  and opportunities  of self enrichment  in which the civil
servants  play not a restraining  but a facilitating  role for the political  leaders  in power.
As Sandbrook  shows, the administrative  decay in Africa is rooted in the pervasive
clientelistic  nature  of politics  pursued  by most  African  "presidential-monarchs,"  who  treat
the public administration  as their personal  property.  According  to Bendix)P,  these
public officials,  in patimonial fashion, then "treat their administrative  work for their
ruler as a personal service based on their duty of obedience  and respect".  Unless
fundamental  restrucuring  and professionaizaton  of the civil service  takes  place  in these
countries,  the prospects  for building  implementation  capacity  wil remain  bleak  despite
donors' efforts and extemal  pressures. The whole structure  of goverance in Africa
needs a thorough  reexamination  and overhaul.
The seven  case  studies  suggest  that  there  is some  urgency  to put in place  measures
during  the process  of implementation  that will neutralie the losers  from the reforms  and
find ways to cushion them from abrupt and large shocks.  For example, spreading
ownership  of public enterprises  to workers and the middle class could reduce the
opposition  to parastatal  reform. Similarly,  involving  civil servant  groups  in civil service
reform could  win their support. At the same  time, the potental winers will need  to be
mobilized  to keep up the pressures for staying  on course.  Jennifer WidnerZy  argues
that, in East Asia, liberalizing  economic  reform was a consequence  of more or less
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explicit 'deals'  negotiated between leaders, technocrats and the heads of the networks
or groups that structure political life.  These compromises  insulated policy making in the
short- and medium-term.  But in the multi-ethnic and fragmented politics of Africa,
strildng such compromises has proved more arduous.
While neutaling  the losers from the reforms is in practice problematic, building
coalitions of  winners from  the  reforms  is  even  more difficult.  The  problem is
particularly severe when, for example, as in the case with trade reform, the gainers (e.g.
consumers) are  many, but each gains a small amount, while the losers (e.g.  textile
workers) are few, but each loses a large amount.  In most other cases of  reforms,
typically the costs are in the present and very certain, but the benefits are in the future
and uncertain.  This makes the task of building coalitions of winners arduous.
A further analysis of the seven country cases on the basis of their record of
capacity to implement  reforms and manage  the political support for these reforms reveals
very intesdng  insights.
In the early phase, Nigeria was able to introduce radical changes in the areas of
exchange  rate, import liberalization,  commodity  pricing and marketing, interest rate, etc.
But the subsequent reforms were either stalled or not fully implemented. This patchy
record of implementation  in Nigeria arises from several factors. While, the conventional
debt rescheduling helped the country in  the inital  period with cash flow relief,  the
continuous capitalizaton of interest in fact worsened the debt stock situation  and the debt
indicators over the medium-tenn.  The inadequacy of durable debt reduction was one of
the reasons for the adjustment fatigue and the consequential  stop-go behavior displayed
by Nigeria politicians and civil servants in the implementation  of the progam.  Second,
the rent seekers lost out heavily by the abolition of import licensing system and they
strived to find other devices to compensate  themselves. Petroleum subsidy, unbudgeted
public expenditures  and other leakages  from the system were found to be the new sources
of  rent  seeking that gained currency and,  finally, contibuted  to  derailment of  the-34  -
program.  Third, the urban middle  classes, especially  profcssionals, the army and civil
servants, were hit very hard by the losses of implicit and explicit consumer subsidies
available in  the form of cheap food, imported goods and transportation. Thus, they
became the main stumbling  block to further reforms in Nigeria.  Fourth, the pursuit of
political liberalization  agenda simultaneously  and in parallel with a difficult economic
reform agenda may have strained the Nigerian  leadership's capacity to deal adequately
with  both  these agendas at  the  same  time  and  stay  on  economic course.  The
administrative  and institutional  capacity  for implementation  in Nigeria  was thus derailed
from the original track due to the combination  of these factors.
As the Nigerian government has a disproportionately  strong control over the
country's foreign exchange  resources through its monopoly  on oil export revenues, the
fragmentation  and disarray among  the Presidency, the Ministry  of Finance, the Nigerian
National  Petroleum Company  and the Central Bank of Nigeria over the control of these
resources further  accentuated  and compounded  institutional  decay and became  one of the
main avenue of  contests for  rent  seeking.  While  these mutually interdependent
institutions  should have worked together to interlock the policy changes, their chaotic,
conflicting and uncoordinated  behavior created more tensions and forced the ultimate
demise of adjustment  program in Nigeria.
In Ghana, the sustainability  was aided by the single-mindedness  of the regime, the
continuity  of a team of competent technocrats  insulated  by political  pressures and fully
supported  by the top leadership  and the visibility of favorable results at an early stage.
The other distinguishing  feature of the Ghanaian  case is the general perception that the
ruling class participated  equally and shared the burden of austerity and hardship  just like
the ordinary citizens. The losers from the reforms were on the retreat as they were
clearly identified with the previous disreputable  political regimes and had no clout.
These  factors softened  the intensity  of the criticisms  against  the reforms substantially,  and
was furhier helped  by the early recovery  of cocoa exports and agricultural  production in
general. But the more deep-seated  reform that  will encourage  private sector investment--35  -
both domestic  and foreign--have  not yet sunk  in. Consultation  and involvement  with  the
private sector is just beginning  and political stability may help this process.  The
prospects  for sustained  long-term  development  will not improve unless the forces of
private  initiative  and enterprise  are unleashed  and the state  plays a more supportive  and
facilitating  role.
The neglect  to involve  the whole  cadre  of civil service  in the process  of refonn,
the demoralizing  influences  of lowering  of real wages  and downsizing  the ranks of the
civil service  and the mistrust  and suspicion  of the high ranking  and experienced  officials
by the new regime  contributed  significantly  to the less than satisfactory  and slow  pace
of implementation  of the second  generation  of the structural  reforms  in Ghana.
Although the reforms have been sustained  in Tanzania, the pace has been
relatively  slow. The early gains in form of increased  availability  of consumer  goods  in
the market,  food  availability  and agriculture  production  response  provided  confidence  to
the policy makers  that other necessary  steps could  be taken without  much risk.  The
number  of winners  from these  early gains  far exceeded  the small  number  of losers  and,
hence, there was widespread  relief. The second  stage of reforms  are still stuck  and the
broad consultation  and participation  by those likely affected such as employees  of
parastatals  have  not taken  place. The consensus  building  process  is taking much  longer
in forging agreement  on some key elements  of the program, such as privafization  of
parastatals,  and the whole  attitude  towards  private  sector  development  has not yet been
freed from the suspicions,  skepticism  and doubts  of the socialst era of the 1970s  and
early 1980s.  In the absence  of some evident movement  on this front, the economic
recovery  is likely  to remain  fragile  and the dependence  on extemal  aid, high. The switch
from highly  centralized  micro  management  of the economy  under the previous  socialist
system of  economic  planning to a  more decentralized  market-based  allocation of
resources  has proved  well beyond  the capacity  of the Tanzanian  civil servants  who are
already strained  by the demands  of external aid agencies. The institutions  that will
support  and breed such  a transition  are almost  non-existent  and this explains,  to a large- 36 -
extent, both the hesitancy and the slow pace of  implementation. This "capacity
impairment"  has been further compounded  by almost an unmanageable  plethora of
foreign-assisted  technical  assistance  and capital projects.  These projects put severe
demand  on the scarce managerial  resources  of the Tanzanian  government  without  always
creating  significant  enduring  benefits  for the economy.
Kenya, like Nigeria, symbolizes  the case of the resurgence  of rent-seekers  in
defending  and regaining  their financial  interests  despite  the strong influence  of rural
producers. Herbstv' notes  that Kenya  represents  the best known  example  in Africa of
how a political  system  has been able to incorporate  agrarian  interests. Much  of the top
leadership  has strong personal  ties in agriculture. As a result, Kenyan  farmers  have
much better access to infrastructure  and good sectoral  policies.  But the progress in
sectors  other  than agriculture  has  been  intermittent  and stymied  by the growing  influence
of the powerful  urban-based  interests,  who used every possible  opportunity  to expand
avenues  for personal  gains  through  other  vehicles  of state  controls  and patronage. The
licensing  system  for imports  and regulatons for doing business  and the overextended
public  enterrises proved  difficult  to dismantle  in Kenya  for this particular  reason. The
financial  sector  was misused  by these  powerful  groups  to gain  personal  benefits  creating,
in turn, a large unanticipated  shock  to the economy  that derailed  the reform  program  in
1991-92. The growing  clientelism  in Kenya was, in recent years, a potent force in
explaining  the nagging  implementation  of refonns, policy  slippages  and reversals.
The fairly  well-developed  administrative  machinery  and the institutional  base of
Kenya,  supplemented  by large inputs of foreign  advisers  and technical  assistance,  was
manipulated  to advance the narrow interests of the ruling elites rather than lay the
foundations  for a solid structure  of a liberal  and equitable  economy.
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Senegal's  program  had been  derailed  (until  January  1994)  for the  last four years.
In the early period  of Senegal's  adjustment,  a core team of influential  technocrats  was
instrumental  in the implementation  of the reforms  by neutralizing  the weight  of the vested
interests, But, once this core group left the scene, the implementation  record became
much weaker. Game  playing  between  IFI's and Senegal  became  the order of the day
with  Senegal  wanting  to maximize  extenWal  resource  flows  by makdng  sure  that the form
of the program  rther  than the spirit was adhered  to.  The IFI's, particularly  the World
Bank,  on the other  hand, put heavy  emphasis  on up-front  action. Senegal's  membership
in the CPA zone also precluded the possibility  of using one of the potent policy
instruments,  i.e., exchange  rate and, thus, the full  blast  of the adjustment  policies  could
not have the desired impact, but the unfettered  support by key bilateral donors also
obviated  the need for bringing  the capacity  up to full steam  to implement  the desirable
reforms.
But there is a positive  lesson in institutional  innovation  to be learnt from the
Senegalese  experience. The AGETIP  project has successfully  carded out an urban
program  of rehabilitation  and maintenance  of infrastructure,  eased  the initial  employment
costs  of adjustment  and helped  increase  the long-term  skills  of both  small  contractors  and
their temporary employees.  This experiment freed the "capacity"  of  the normal
govemment  agencies  and made  an excellent  stride  in using  the under-utiized  "capacity"
of extra-governmental  resources.
Burundi's example  is more revealing.  In the case of Burundi, the wholesale
dominance of  the  public sector, the  heavy juridico-regulatory  environment, the
inadequacy  of the  banldng  sector,  the weak  expertise  of management  in the  private  sector
and poor infonnation  services,  have combined  to produce  a muted response  to policy
changes. For example, increased  export earnings  from successive  devaluations  were
absorbed  almost entirely by agroindustrial  public enterprises  as the output prices of
exports  crops  were administered  and kept at low level. Thus it was not the inadequacy- 38 -
of institutional capacity that should bear the brunt but a myriad of other factors described
above.
A  strong,  committed  military leader  embarked on  reforms  of  political and
economic systems simultaneously, overcame some of these constraints. The initial record
of  implementing economic reforms under Buyoya was not too bad but the electorate
rejected  him at the polls and thus interrupted the ongoing process  of reforms.  The
resulting political chaos and confusion, including the assassination of the newly elected
President, sparked mainly by underlying ethnic tensions, did not permit the continuation
of  reformed  economic policies.  The question that  can be  raised  with  the  help of
hindsight is:  whether Burundi,  with its peculiar ethnic configuration, proceeded too
rapidly in its political liberalization attempt without putting in place an apparatus that
would have counter-railed or neutralized the ethnic divisiveness.
The case of Cote d'Ivoire is more difficult to interpret.  This was one of the few
African countries that had succeeded  in bringing about a structural transformation of the
economy  in  the  1960s-70s.  Like  in  Kenya,  the  administrative capacity and  the
institutional framework evolved remarkably well over time and were aided by the French
resident experts.  But twelve years of austerity, hardships and declining living standards
and increasing indebtedness, fatigue had set in among those who had been sacrificing
already while  the urban elites were remarhbly  comfortable and  cushioned from the
crisis.  The recognition of "problem" among the Ivorian leadership dawned when other
neighboring adjusting countries started flooding their  markets with  their  goods and
showing resurgence in growth.  This contagion effect may therefore parTy explain the
motivation for Cote d'Ivoire's  change of heart towards devaluation in January 1994.
It was not lack of implementation capacity but lack of political conviction about
the efficacy of policy measures themselves (to be reversed much later in the day) that
contributed to the dysfunctional state of the Ivouian economy in the 1980s.- 39 -
The evidence from the seven countries suggests that implementation capacity,
though highly critical  to the success of  reform programs,  was not always a  binding
constraint in every single case.  Only in Tanzania did it proved an unequivocally strong
factor, but  in other  countries the fragmentation of executive authority  (Nigeria), the
convergence of interests among the bureaucrats and the ruling political party (Kenya),
the lack of conviction about ffie efficacy of  refonns  themselves (C6te d'lvoire),  the
substitution of efforts by donor financing (Senegal) and a host of structural weaknesses
(Burundi), were relatively more important.  This does not, however, deny the fact that
the institutions and the human resource-base needed for rapid,  equitable and sustained
development are weak in Africa and need to be strengthened.  Our case studies only
suggest that other  factors intervened well before the capacity to implement could be
adequately tested.
What Useful Lessons Can Be Drawn?
The broad lessons that can be drawn from the management  and political economy
aspects of adjustment in these seven countries can be summarized as follows:
(a)  The design of the programs should usually follow two phases.  In  the
initial phase when changes are sought in the incentive structure by altering
relative prices  such as  exchange rates,  interest rates,  tariffs and taxes,
producer prices, public utility prices, etc. a team of competent technocrats
insulated by political pressures can be more effective in introducing and
implementing  these changes. At the second stage, when more far reaching
changes are the objective such as public enterprise refonns,  downsizing
of civil service, de protection of manufacturing sectors, etc., widespread
consultations and discussions with affected groups and economic actors are
helpful in clarifying issues and building consensus.- 40 -
(b)  The political commitment  to the program will be strengthened  if  the
economic  reforms generate  recovery  and supply response  in the earlier
years  of  the  program, thus  mobilizing the  potential beneficiaries,
otherwise a  sense of  fatigue and  cynicism creeps in  eroding the
commitment. Foreign inflows in the right amount and right time and
favorable  prices  for Africa's major  commodity  exports  can help reinforce
the commitment,  but the positive  results  early on are the only solid basis
on which further reforms  can be built upon. In a sequenced  approach  to
the reforms  the more  difficult  reforms  can withstand  resistance  only if the
earlier reforms  had shown  some  positive  results.  Open  communications
and education  of the population  at every stage of implementation  are the
sine  qua non for the success  of the program. As more  and more countries
are  embarking upon  a  parliamentary form  of  democracy, early
sensitization  and involvement  of the parliamentary  groups in the design
and supervision  of the program  may prove helpful. The challenge  is how
to convert the widespread  populist sentiment  of the elected  leaders to a
more prudent management  of scarce econonic resources for the larger
benefit  of the society  rather han themselves  or their allies.
(c)  The general finding  from the successful  examples  of adjustnent-Ghana,
Nigeria and Tanzania-is that the urban bias of the past was largely
reversed  as the population  in the rural  areas benefitted  substantially,  while
key urban groups shouldered  a large share of the cost. However, new
coalitions  of beneficiaries  were not created  in any of the countries  which
could support the reform programs. As a consequence,  powerful  urban
groups-trade unions, middle class professionals,  and students-came to
form the main opposition  to certain reform polices and programs.  In
Nigeria, the challenge to mobilize  the diffused rural support, without
antagonizing  a  better organized urban population, proved difficult to
tackde.- 41 -
It is important to neutralize the losers from reforms, such as vocal middle
classes of professionals, army, civil servants, journalists, students, labor
unions,  industrialists, universities, etc.,  who are likely to be adversely
affected by the liberalization and ensuing competition. It is not enough to
either ignore them lightly as vested interests or repress them.  They are
important potential contributors to development process and also have a
tremendous influence in organizing and mobilizing public opinion.  Those
who are truly committed to their professions will either withdraw from the
scene  and  emigrate  thus  depriving  the  country  of  valuable  skills.
Although  this  challenge  of  neutralizing  the  losers  is  -inting, the
involvement  of professional associations, opinion makers and other interest
groups,  and  consultations  with  these  groups  in  the  design  and
implementation  of policies affecting them, will be helpful in understanding
their  view  points  and  concerns and  arriving  at  mutually acceptable
solutions.  The  current  practice  of  'secrecy'  and  inadequate
communication and consultation accentuates the feeling of mistrust and
suspicion.
Others will still try to destabilize the progran  and create opposition and
hindrances in the implementation by magnifying the harmful effects and
the hardships.  Some meaningfil way of accommodating their interests
and neutalzing  the adversity imposed upon them will eventually enhance
the consensus building and facilitate implementation of the program.
(d)  Unlike East Asian countries where a "strong" executive authority played
a critical role in implementing reforns,  the "weakness" and "patrimonial"
nature of the state in African countries proved to be a hindrance.  The
"unsure" and 'insecure"  leaders could not always persevere  in face of
adversity and hostile opposition.  The only exception was Ghana with a
'strong"  leader  and  a  "technocratic"  team  insulated  from  political- 42 -
pressures.  The  distinction between commitment and  capacity is  not
always  clear cut.  Where  the  executive authority  is  fully behind the
program, on the basis of its own internal conviction rather than external
pressure, it does make sure that the execution and implementation  do take
place with  due diligence and at the  requisite speed to  achieve results
within the given time frame.  The leadership assigns this task to the most
competent individuals and most efficient grnups and  institutions, then
monitors the progress  and results from  time to time  and  rewards and
punishes the individuals concerned on that basis.
(e)  Flexibility and agility in responding to exogenous  and unanticipated shocks
and surprises--either external or domestic--differentiate those who have
succeeded in keeping the reform process on course from those who failed
to stop the derailment.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, external donors play a
major part in reinforcing the willingness of the policy makers to make the
appropriate and timely decisions.  Their own  response to  the  specific
situations should be  equally prompt  and  adequate.  The  performance
criteria negotiated originally should be modified and contingency  financing
mechanisms triggered  of  immediately  without  waiting  to  determine
whether the shocks are transitory or permanent in nature.  The protracted
discussion on  the question as to  whether or  not the response to  these
should  be  through  further  adjustment  or  additional  financing  can
potentially disrupt  the  reform process.  The  example of  response  to
drought in Southern Africa during the course of  the adjustment period
provides powerful corroboration.
Iplications  for Policy
The  evidence  presented  in  this  paper  strongly  suggests  that  the  sustained
application of  adjustment policies is  explicable in  terms  of  two variables-domestic- 43 -
ownership and capacity.  These findings carry extremely important implications for the
elaboration of future policies for the African governments and their external partners.
There .s an urgent need for the African governments to go beyond their limited
and  small groups of  technocratic advisers and civil servants to  consult, educate and
inform the representatives of  the civil  society and opinion makers in the  design and
implementation of  adjustment  policies  and  institutional  restructuring.  A  strong,
committed and visionary leadership that places these policy reforms in the context of
long-term development path of the country can provide the bonding and cementing of
diverse and divergent viewpoints and nurture a shared vision for the future.
For the IFI's and extemal donors, who are supporting African governments, the
narrow, short-term and conditionality-driven  enforcement and compliance of agreements
need to be replaced by a medium- to long-term framework of macro, sectoral policy and
investment and institutional changes developed and owned by government, keeping the
short-term capacity as given constraints, but taking measures to develop this capacity
within the time  horizon of  the  long-term framework. This  framework can  then  be
translated into time-bound, specific action programs on various agreed upon changes
between the donors and the African governments.
Both the African governments and their external partners have to rethink on the
measures that will build, save, udlize and enhance the capacity of African govemments,
private sectors, NGO's,  professional groups, universities and research institutes.  The
adversarial relationship between the government and the private sector will have to be
transformed into a symbiotic and constructive partnership aimed at achieving the long-
term developmental goals.  The effectiveness of the present practices of delivering the
technical assistance by external donors has been sufficiently questioned and a new mode
of  delivering  this  assistance  employing  capacity  building  and  ufilization  as  the
overreaching objeceive needs to  be developed.  The transferability of institutions or- 44 -
policies  from one setting  to another  has always  proved  difficult,  but, at least, adaptation
of successful  practices  that have worked  elsewhere  should  be encouraged.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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